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I. INTRODUCTION 
A review of the Political Business Cycle (PBC) literature 
provides grounds for cautious optimism: the literature is cumulative 
and it exhibits steady theoretical advancement. Early contributions 
focused primarily on the demand side of the system, i.e. do voters 
react to economic fluctuations in simple, direct, self-interested 
fashion (e.g. Kramer, 1971)? More recently, the supply side of the 
system has attracted attention: do governments stimulate their 
economies in the period prior to elections then dampen those economies 
after the electoral challenge is past (e.g. Nordhaus, 1975)? And in 
current research scholars have begun to integrate the two sides of 
the system as part of what ultimately may become a reasonable general 
equilibrium model of the PBC (e.g. Fair, 1975; Frey and Schneider, 
1978a). 
Past achievements and salutory prospects aside, numerous 
questions remain and various disagreements persist. For one thing, 
many of us doubt that democratic governments, especially the more 
decentralized ones, have either the political capability or the 
economic knowledge to bring about a neat, periodic cycle in the 
macro-economy. Others deny that voters react in the simplistic ways 
2 
that the current PBC models presume. Yet even granting the I v,lliditi, 
of such criticisms, it appears certain that some type of ill- efin�l 
i"!'reci'e election,-econo.,, inter�tion exiet' (perhape ju'f oreg��.g 
the term "cycle" would avoid much controversy). Even if govel!nmen 
can not reliably manipulate the macro-economy, they can and I d'd man 
pulate transfer payments, public works programs, and various 
specific activities (Tufte, 1978). And even if voters are ho 
ther 
as 
myopic as present models presume, who doubts that some partloil the 
ns L electoral outcome reflects voter reaction to economic conditf 
the country? The question becomes trivial when one considels 
cases like the Great Depression, from which the American Re�u 
party has yet to recover. The existence of some elections-re 
nexus can be taken for granted. The important task of the next 
generation of PBC studies is to elaborate and refine the coLp 
ex tr I 
lie a 
no my 
nent 
models which individually draw scholarly fire. 
As a first step in doing so, I propose to examinel ome 
important part of the PBC. Demand side analyses typically ad�pt 
=tr�ely eiIDplified =dele of =ting behavior. Moreover. rh 
eeti=ti= of 'uch =dele g=erally �ploye highly aggregal"" Ida ta
compiled in time series. For some time I have been studying ,the 
ba'i' (•c=omic ond otherwiBe) of individua1 =ting u'ing �r;ey 
data from the American National Election studies of 1956-19176 [ Th• 
paper reports some selected findings from that larger project 
1 I 
�phaeiae that I � =t propo,ing individual l�el, croe'-1�tion 
analysis as an alternative to the aggregate, time series analvses 
already carried out. Rather, I am simply attempting to lodk more 
3 
closely than previous studies at the micro-level basis of the PBC 
dynamic. Given the nature of the enterprise I suspect that the PBC 
literature will continue to rely on time series of aggregate data, 
but perhaps second generation demand side models will profit from 
the endeavors of those of us who shuffle along on the micro-level. 
II. ELECTORAL COMPONENTS OF EXISTING PBC MODELS 
Past research has focused on the estimation of two basic 
models of the electorate's reaction to the hypothesized expansion-
contraction dynamic. One of these models is direct, the second a 
bit less so. Kramer's (1971) seminal work exemplifies those models 
which presume a direct impact of economic conditions on voting. 
The division of the popular vote for Congress is taken as the 
dependent variable and various economic indicators as the independent 
variables. 2 Other studies in this vein include Stigler (1973) and 
Arcelus and Meltzer (1975). Niskanen (1975) has estimated an 
analogous model for American Presidential elections. Although the 
details differ from study to study, the overall picture that emerges 
is one of an electorate which acts as a "rational god of the vengeance 
and reward, " (Key, ·1964, p. 568) with the emphasis on vengeance 
according to some studies (Bloom and Price, 1975). 
The indirect approach concentrates on the estimation of 
"popularity functions. " Analysts of survey data (not to mention 
politicians) have long recognized that executive popularity bears 
a strong relationship to the vote. If popularity itself varies 
with economic performance, a two step effect of the latter on 
voting exists. Such a covariance has been demonstrated repeaj 
For the United States see Kernell (1978), Frey and Schneidel (I 
for Great Britain, Frey and Schneider (1978b); for the Germln: 
4 
.dly
l 978
ede 
Republic, Frey and Schneider (1978c); and for France, Lafayl (�978) 
of 
Thus, aggregate level analyses provide a considerab: 
evidence that economic conditions affect the electoral fltes of
the governments associated (justifiably or not) with them. IFdr th 
most part however, aggregate analysts do not give a great dea' 
thought to the individual behavior which underlies the aggrlg 
study. Indeed, many of the disagreements which exist amonglt 
who estimate vote and/or popularity functions probably 
differing but unspoken ideas about how voters behave. 
implicitly presume a simple retrospective model; the voter is 
myopic, concerned with outcomes rather than policies, and f�n 
especially easy to monitor ups and downs in his economic silu 
presumably associated with fluctuations in the economy. Bul 
•cholar• (e.g. Stigler) are agoo•tic about economic influen�e 
voting precisely because they hold a considerably more comp!e 
of the voter: not so myopic as to forget everything prior lo 
election year, concerned with the economic policy differencbs 
(perhaps nonexistent) between the parties, and aware that gbv 
may have little or nothing to do with fluctuations in the ebo 
If one holds such a view, the estimation of aggregate vote/�o 
functions appears rather simple-minded, and the traces of a�g 
affects can be dismissed as spurious. 
of 
tes 
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on 
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It is easy enough to perform the micro-level analpgues o 
t 
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the aggregate vote and/or popularity functions. The next section of 
this paper contains such an exercise. Unfortunately, a bit of 
thought reveals that the effort is even more subject to charges of 
simple-mindedness than analyses utilizing aggregate time series data. 
Thus, we offer a more elaborate model of the individual voting 
decision in section IV of the paper. Succeeding sections report 
estimations of statistical models based on the theoretical development 
of section IV. 
III. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VOTE AND POPULARITY FUNCTIONS, A FIRST CUT 
The American National Election (hereafter CPS) Studies 
contain a variety of items which elicit the individual's personal 
financial situation and employment status, as well as more general 
perceptions of the performance of the government in handling the 
economy and of business conditions in the country. Occasionally, 
items dealing with trends in taxation and inflation appear as well. 
For reasons which will be evident later I use the 1972-76 CPS Panel 
Study for the estimations in this paper, with all vote and popularity 
functions based on the 1974-1976 wave. The survey items which produce 
the dummy variables used in the analyses which follow are: 
Financial Situation. "Would you say that you (and your 
family living here) are better off or worse off finan-
cially than you were a year ago?" 
Business Conditions. "Would you say that at the present 
time business conditions are better or worse than they 
were a year ago?" 
Head Unempioyed. Dummy variable based on whether headto 
family is now unemployed or was out of work during the 
preceding twelve months. 
Recession. Dummy variable based on whether respondentto 
his family was materially 
(i.e. loss of employment, 
conditions) • 
affected by the 1974-75 recess:iJon . 
I lower wages, fewer hours, poor 
6 
Government Inflation Performance. "Thinking about thelstjeps 
that have been taken to fight inflation--would you saylttiat 
the government has been doing a good job, only fair, or 
poor job?" 
Government Unemployment Performance. "Now how about the· 
gove�nt'• eoonomio policy dealing with unemployment ­
would you say the government has been doing a good job, 
only fair, or a poor job?"  Presidential Performance. "Do you approve or disapprove 
of the way Mr. Ford is handling his job as President?" 
Nixon Pardon. "Shortly after taking office, President 
Ford pardoned Richard Nixon for any wrong-doings he may 
have committed while he was President. Do you think 
Ford should have pardoned Nixon?" 
Civil Rights. "Do you think that Civil Rights leaders 
are trying to push too fast, are going too slowly, or 
are they moving at about the right speed?" 
While the Nixon pardon and civil rights variables lane no 
of direct interest to the participants in this oonfer��
-
lh�� 
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included in the analysis in an attempt to get as complete a specifi-
3 cation as possible. Many of the aggregate analyses are underspecified 
in that they include only economic variables, and attempt to account 
for all other influences by introducing a few dummy variables for 
wars, and/or for different administrations or governments. 
The simple.vote functions for the 1976 presidential and 
congressional voting, and the 1976 Ford popularity function appear 
4 in Table 1. As seen, the results are consistent with those of the 
aggregate analyses previously reported. In the vote functions, 
approval of Ford's performance and his pardon of Nixon have a large 
and highly significant impact on the probability of voting Republican. 
Financial situation has some importance in the congressional equation 
but virtually none in the presidential equation. At the societal 
level the business conditions item is significant in both vote 
functions, uhile the inflation and unemployment performance items 
appear important only in the presidential equation. Turning to the 
popularity function we see that the results are parallel to but 
generally stronger than those for the vote functions. The summary 
statistics may not impress those used to working with aggregate time 
series data, but for survey data the fits are quite satisfactory. 
[Table 1 here] 
The problem with the foregoing analysis is apparent to any 
survey analyst: the items utilized are subjective perceptions, not 
objective indicators. When an aggregate analysis finds executive 
popularity declining as unemployment rises, little causal ambiguity 
exists. But what if presidential popularity is· lowest among those 
TABLE 1 
PROBIT ESTIMATES FOR SIMPLE VOTE AND POPULARITY FUNCTIONS 
Ford  Performance 
Nixon Pardon 
Finarcial Situation - Same 
- Better 
Govefnment Inflation Performance 
- Fair 
- Good 
Government Unemployment Performance 
- Fair 
- Good 
Head Unemployed 
Bus�ness Conditions - Better 
- Same 
Recession 
Civ�l Rights - Too Fast 
- Too Slow 
leon4tant 
lcor�ectly Predicted - Probit 
- Null 
R2
n 
tip < .10 
* p < .OS
•• p < .01 
1976 
Presidential Vote 
1.39** 
.BS** 
- .03 
- .06 
.07 
.42** 
.21* 
.2lt 
- .21• 
.3S** 
- .OB 
.19* 
- .43* 
-1.78** 
80.1 % 
S7.7 
.57 
1,379 
1976 
Congressional Vote 
. 93** 
.44** 
.17t 
.22* 
- .18 
.19 
- .02 
.13 
- .14 
.20* 
- .OS 
.06 
- .38* 
-1.14** 
70.2 % 
57.0 
.33 
1,140 
: I a
119�� 
Ford P� ulari I I I 
1 .. 
.qo 
.1�1 
:�a•• 
1!43•* 
;p 
J4•• 
"."+-
l** 
:b9 
'17•• 
�bs 
;56** 
lib3 
�7.� % 
6lf 
� 0
HS 
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who believe government performance on unemployment is poorest? Is 
the causal link obvious? Or is it the case that offended Poles, 
vindictive Reaganites, and born-again Christians rate Ford and his 
unemployment performance (and other things as well) poorly on 
entirely unrelated grounds. Potentially even more confounding is 
party identification (PID). Political scientists at this conference 
no doubt are familiar with this concept (though my European colleagues 
have shown the good sense not to swallow uncritically the American 
concept) but other participants may appreciate a brief exegesis. 
Party Identification is heid to be an enduring, affective affiliation 
with a party, an affiliation with many of the same characteristics 
as a religious identification. Not only is PID the single most 
important influence on voting in American elections, but it appears 
to act as a "perceptual screen" through which individuals evaluate 
politically relevant events and conditions, an administration's 
economic performance for example (Campbell, et al. , 1960). The 
believer in the preceding concept of PID would dismiss most of Table 
1. The financial situation, business conditions, and unemployment 
items probably are okay--these items contain no political referent. 
But the Ford Performance, Nixon Pardon, and Governm�nt Performance 
items would arouse great suspicion. Possibly they reflect no more 
than an individual's preexisting positive or negative feelings toward 
the party which happens to hold the presidency. 
The traditional conception of PID is currently undergoing 
revision, but that does not obviate all problems. Clearly it is 
dangerous to take Table 1 at face value--voter subjectivity probably 
does color the answer to several of 
account of that fact. The standard 
the items, and Table 1 tlak�s 
 , reaction at this point :lisito 
10 
no 
include an explicit "control" for PID into the analysis and Ptbceed 
I have done that in the past (1978), but that too now seems sitple­
minded. Instead, let us leave the data temporarily and consid r 
the voting decision of an average citizen, one responsive td the 
::::::,::·�::�::�·:.:·.::'�:�':::,�: :::::�.·:::::�:��'�: 
ones neither devoid of content nor impervious to change. 
* 
IV. AN OUTLINE FOR A MODEL OF PARTY CHOICE 
Simple Issue Voting 
Imagine a society created ex nihilo with a two par[� 
democratic system imposed on it by the creating force. How wo�ld n 
citizens make their voting decisions? Let us indicate by Xi tj e ve 
of policy positions held by individual i, by SQ the vector of polil 
constituting the present social state (i. e. the
p
status nuo), b 9 +j - ..i . p -
1/Jp+l the vectors of policies which lead to alternative futurle ' ocia 
states (Le. the campaign pledges of parties 9 and 1/J), and biY' i th 
utility function of the i th citizen. At this time nothing Jeecl. be 
assumed about the latter except that it is monotonically deck�.sing 
the "distance" (however defined), of a social state from thel citize 
I 
*This section is based on an article of the same name (1977)  d a 
more extensive development in the book in progress. In the i, eres of space I have eliminated all but the barebones of the argum t 
including most of the motivation for the model, the justifiJat"on 
for various features, and some supporting data. As result it ill 
no doubt strike some readers as even more arbitrary than it l is. 
r 
s 
th 
My principal object here is to motivate the statistical models in 
mmdfog ••c<inM, •n I bag <ho raadar' a forbaaranca. 
-· L, __ !Hllll I----
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preferred position, and at its maximum when the two coincide. 5 
Because I will be referring to an arbitrary citizen in what follows 
I will drop the superscript i. 
In the absence of any history whatsoever it seems natural 
that a voter in the new society would evaluate the contending parties 
in terms of their promised changes in his personal welfare between 
the present, p, and the next election at (p + 1). In the notation 
introduced above we can represent these evaluations as: 
E (9) = U (Xp+l ' 9p+l) - U (Xp, SQP) 
E (l/J) = U (Xp+l' 1/Jp+l) - U (Xp ' S�) 
and he votes for 9 rather than 1/J only if 
E (9) � E (l/J)
which implies 
U (Xp+l' 9p+l) - U (Xp+l' 1/Jp+l) > O. 
The decision rule (2) represents simple issue voting, a vote based 
solely on an evaluation of the relative attractiveness of the two 
parties' platforms. (2) of course, is the postulate of partisan 
choice which underlies simple spatial models of party competition. 
Simple Retrospective Voting 
In the hypothetical society under consideration assume 
that party e wins the first election and governs the society for 
one interelection period. At the time of the next election how 
(1) 
(2) 
)• ' 
does a citizen choose between 9 and 1/J? Certainly, he could! aiain 
use (2), but should he ignore the "hardest" bit of informatic(rl he 
has--9' s performance during his term in office? Surely notl. '!But 
just how can the citizen take 9's performance into account? 
Downs (1957) suggests one way; namely, that the cit;:ilzen 
USeS e IS past performance tO estimate e IS likely future posl61on. 
Recall the Downsian argument that past actions provide a mot� 
estimate of future actions than do campaign pledges. Certain�y 
argument has merit, but Downsian theory is not the whole stlr, 
the real political world the citizen might learn that e is lo, 
petent that stated positions bear little or no relation to to 
 outcomes. Or reliability and responsibility aside, it could 
his policies typically work out well for the citizen. 
citizens might even believe that future issues are disjoint If' 
successfully confronted past issues. In such circumstances 
performance would be irrelevant according to Downs. 
the preceding cases 9's performance still conveys some 
about his general ability or competence to govern. 
For these reasons the model adopts the more traditio 
concept of retrospective voting. The incumbent's past perfJr
, 
will not be treated merely as a means for estimating the tejmsl in
(2), although nothing precludes that possibility. Rather, Jh� 
incumbent' s performance will be treated as a "bias" in the Jit'• 
voting decision, with the degree of bias directly related td tne 
citizen's evaluation of the incumbent's performance. Rathej than 
(2), consider (3).6 
e 
where 
a 1 [ (X ' e ) - u (X l ' SQ 1) ] p- p p p- p-
+ ap [U(Xp+l' 8p+l) - U (Xp+l ' l)Jp+l)] :::: 0 
a 1 :::: O p-
a :::: 0 p 
e p = SQP. 
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The decision rule given by (3) is an attempt to formalize the 
concept of retrospective voting. The bracketed term weighted by 
a 1 constitutes a bias, an a priori merit or demerit in the mind p- -
of an elector. If the citizen has prospered under the incumbent, 
he enters the voting booth predisposed toward the incumbent, ceteris 
paribus. If the citizen has suffered, the challenger might capture 
his vote even with an inferior campaign platform. 
While plausible on its face, perhaps (3) is needlessly 
restrictive. Consider the candidate evaluations which generate (3): 
E (8) a. l [U(X ' e ) - U (X l ' SQ 1) � p p � � 
+ a [U(X +l ' e +1> - U (X ' e ) ] p p p p p 
E (l)J) = ap [U(Xp+l ' l)Jp+l) - U (Xp, 8)] . 
Clearly, from (4) we see that the hallmark of (3) is its asymmetry. 
There is no "what might have been" term for the challenger. Rather, 
(3) assigns the initiative to the incumbent to make or break his 
(3) 
(4) 
14 
own fortunes. If the incumbent has performed well, he entets' I the
campaign with a stock of credit. If he has performed poorl�,: lhe 
enters the campaign with a handicap. This asymmetry is not 
bothersome--real elections are asymmetric. Focusing on the 
at hand, I expect that many Americans considered Ford's hanal�ng 
of the economy when they made their voting decision in 1976l Hut I 
I doubt that many took the additional step of calculating what McGov 
might have done. 
Still, perhaps some did. Perhaps a citizen's lotl has 
improved under the incumbent, but he believes that any given :�•man 
I , from Missouri" could have done even better. By totally ignor+ng 
"opportooi<y oo•to," do - go too far? Why not lonk upon (r) ,., 
a special case in which the citizen completely ignores the poten-
tial performance of the challenger? The general case would[ n:· clud_ 
: a term representing the challenger's hypothetical past perfo' nee· 
where 
r 1a l [U (X , 1jJ ) - U (X l ' SQ 1)] p- p- p p p- p-
O < r  1 < 1. p- -
We can think of r as a reliability, uncertainty, or competehC:· 
I , discount. If the citizen believed not a word of what the cha
I said, or paid no attention, r = O, thus producing (3). Becars· 
incumbent actually governed, his performance is not similarly 
discounted; the voter experiences the effects on-:s welfarl • 
which have occurred. 
leng 
the 
Thus, a more general retrospective voting model has 
candidate evaluations of 
s s s E (8) = a l (U - u 1) + a (U +l - u ) p- p p- p p p 
w w s E ($) = r 1a 1(u - U 1) + a (U +l - u ) p- p- p p- p p p 
where notation is simplified as follows: 
and 
(US - U 1) p p-
(UW - U 1) p p-
(us - us)p+l p 
cuW - us) p+l p 
[U (X , S ) - U (X l' � 1) J p p p- p-
[U(X , $ ) p p U (X l' SQ 1) J p- p-
[U (Xp+l' Sp+l) - U (Xp, Sp) J 
[U(Xp+l' $p+l) - U (Xp, Sp) J 
Sp is the actual s�, while 
$ is an hypothetical SQ , when p p 
s is incumbent, $ challenger 
The candidate evaluations (41) in turn yield a more 
general retrospective voting model: 
Vote for S only if: 
s s w w a 1cu -u 1)+a( u +1- u +1)- r  1a 1cu - u 1)>0p- p p- p p p p- p- p p-
15 
Although complex in appearance, (3') is quite simple. It asserts 
that in making his voting decision the citizen l�oks at the 
(4') 
(3') 
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incumbent's performance, the alternative platforms of the 
and challenger and (perhaps) imagines a hypothetical past 
term for the previous challenger. 
It is worth pointing out that even (3') provides [la 
for a great deal of individual level variation in voting bJh�vior. 
If we presume a 1 << a , we have the classic policy voter of p- p 
p- p democratic theory. If we presume a 1 >> a , we have the "tn�
. 
ture 
of the times" voter of The American Voter (190). The introdpctidn!llbf - -
 the past performance term and the variable weights, a 1, a ;p- p. 
r _1 allow for dissimilar appearing voting decisions within tfe P I . 
confines of a single model. 
One final modification. We have discounted the cr:+lengelltlls 
hypothetical past performance by a factor, r 1, in recognitl ±dn of p-
the uncertainty and ignorance surrounding· such a calculation. : I The 
same considerations suggest a similar discounting of the rb sed 
future performances of both candidates. If we discount S's p omis 
by sp and $'s by rp, then we can write formally symmetric cindidat 
evaluations as 
where 
E (S) 
E ($) 
s p-1 
s s s s 1a 1cu - U 1) + s a (U +l - U ) p- p- p p- p p p p 
·r 1a l (U
W - U 1) + r a (U
W
+l - U
S) p- p- p p- p p p p 
l, O < s., r. < l . 
- J J 
Having proceeded thus far, the next step is reasonably obviclus,. 
') 
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Party Identification 
Assume that our hypothetical society has been in exist-
ence for several generations. How do the descendants of the 
original issue and retrospective voters make their voting decisions? 
I suggest that to some extent or another the descendant takes into 
account all past experiences with the parties, for the election 
occurring at the time of his first political consciousness to the 
present, p, and the future, p + 1. Thus, ( 4 ") is generalized to 
where 
E (8) 
p 
I s .a.. (u8 
j=l J J j+l 
- uj) 
E (l/I) 
p 
l r .et.. (Ul/I 
j=l J J j H 
- uj) 
O < r., s. < l  
- J J 
sj 1 if 8 is incumbent during period j 
rj 1 if 1/1 is incumbent during period j 
and a citizen votes for 8 rather than 1/1 only if E (8) � E (l/J). This 
formulation yields the issue voting and retrospective voting 
formulations as special cases. But it also allows the sixty-five 
year old union member to vote for McGovern partly on the basis of 
his approval of FDR. This last observation sounds curiously 
reminiscent of statements about party identification. How close 
is the connection? 
(5) 
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We can decompose the general candidate evaluations ihto 
two classes of terms: past political evaluations (PPE), and curre 
issue evaluations (CIE), i.e. 
E (8) 
E (l/I) 
where 
PPE (8) 
CIE (8) 
PPE (1/1) 
CIE (1/1) 
PPE (8) + CIE (8) 
PPE (l/I) + CIE (1/1) 
p-1 
Is.a..cu8 - u ) 
j=l J J j+l j 
8 spet.p (Up+l - Up) 
p-1 
I r.a. cul/I 
j=l J j j+l 
- U.) 
J 
1/1 r et. (U +l - U ) p p p p 
The PPE terms summarize the citizen's past experiences with 
two parties, while the CIE terms represent his appraisal of 
alternative futures the parties promise him. Now, in light l ofl the 
preceding discussion it seems natural to propose the 
definition of party identification: 
PID(8) (PPE (8) - PPE (l/I) + y) 
PID (�i) = - PID(8) 
PID = independent, if PID (8) = PID(l/I) = 0 
where y is an initial bias (+, 0, -) which the individual 
the political arena. (Presumably y is a direct function of 
to 
') 
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socialization, but indirectly a function of the past political 
experiences of the socializing agents) . In (6) we have a concept of 
PID which captures the presumed long-term essence of the notion while 
providing a mechanism for change in response to current political 
experience . This notion of party ID has its roots in reality, albeit 
mostly in past reality . Nevertheless, in the various discounting 
variables (s., r.,a.) there is considerable room for psychology to 
J J J 
operate on reality . If not completely "rational, " the model at 
least attempts to be highly reasonable . 
With the definition of party ID advanced above, we can 
write the candidate evaluations in quite simple form . A citizen 
votes for 8 rather than ¢ only if E (8) - E (¢) � 0 which is equiva-
lent to 
PID(8) + CIE (8) - CIE (¢) � y. 
Thus, according to this model, party ID combines additively with 
current issue concerns . But to reiterate, party ID at any given time 
is a function of political evaluations up to that time . 
The Statistical Models 
The next three sections of this paper present statistical 
analyses based on the model just outlined . This section describes 
the general form those models take . One of the models reflects (6), 
another (7), and a third reflects the way CPS gives us the data . All 
of this should become clear momentarily . 
In an ongoing democratic system party choice occurs at the 
conclusion of the pth period of an individual's political awareness . 
(7) 
2 
According to (5) that choice is based on expectations for th� (p + 
period, evaluations of life during the pth period, and carly�ver 
judgments from periods 1 to (p - 1) • Let {RE}j signify an lnali.vid 
I set of retrospective evaluations formed during period j .  So 
{RE} will focus on Democratic administrations, some on Replbili.can 
But assuming such elaluati some will be positive, some negative . 
I are comparable for the individual, (6) suggests the follow;i.ng1 
statistical model of present PID: 
PID p 
p 
y + l B.RE. + u 
i=l l. l. p 
where RE. is a vector of Retrospective Evaluations for period! i, a J. I I B. is the associated vector of coefficients . 
l. 
Owing to 
structure of the model (8) can be decomposed to 
PID p PID l 
+ B RE + (u - u 1) p- p p p p-
which is estimable with panel data . 
ili 
Given the known stability of party ID (9) shouldfp�rmit 
good fit to the observed data . The critical question is wlietner 
I ! observed temporal changes in party ID are purely rand9m movem 
reflecting measurement error and idiosyncratic variation, jr ' 
nts 
het 
such changes are systematically associated with the individual's 
retrospective judgments of contemporary politics . 
The {RE}. themselves are theoretically exogenous, 1 but 
because of certain
] 
characteristics of the available data ij i 
prudent to treat some of them as endogenous . Specifically,! the 
surveys give us two kinds of retrospective evaluations, diJec 
h 
's 
(8) 
(9) 
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retrospective evaluations (DRE), and mediated retrospective 
evaluations (MRE). The DRE include such items as personal financial 
situation, civil rights, etc. which appear to reflect citizens' 
direct experiences or impressions of political events or conditions. 
In contrast, the MRE include such items as presidential performance 
and administration economic performance--summary judgments which 
probably reflect a citizen's choice of information sources and 
opinion leaders, which in turn reflect prior predispositions. 8 
This division of RE into two pure types is somewhat oversimplified. 
No doubt the survey items fall along a rough continuum with the 
personal financial situation item anchoring the DRE end 
and the presidential performance item the MRE end. Most of us 
could agree that the business conditions item falls closer to the 
DRE end while the government inflation performance item falls 
closer to the MRE end, but ultimately, the distinction between items 
treated as basic (exogenous) and those taken as objects of explanation 
remains somewhat arbitrary. At any rate we will estimate several 
special cases of the following model: 
MRE p,i PID l + B DRE + C MRE •4. + D Z + u p- p p p p,Jrl p p p 
where Z is a vector of additional exogeneous variables, and D the p p 
associated vector of coefficients. 
(10) 
In words, each specific MRE should depend on relevant DRE (e.g. 
government economic performance on personal financial situation), 
less "general" MRE (e.g. presidential performance on economic 
performance), and the store of earlier retrospective evaluations 
(PIDt-l) possessed by the citizen. I'emphasize that inclusion of
 I i PIDp-l in (9) is not soley a "control" for "partisan bias" las 
traditionally conceptualized. The intent is broader. PID 1 p-
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.ve should proxy two factors. First, all individuals do not r1cJ
random samples of political information. The steelworker may 
judge the performance of a Democratic president on the basils !@f 
the union newsletter, whereas the manager of his plant may le+y 
I on the Wall Street Journal. No doubt one's party ID is assoc 
with this kind of systematic difference in receipt of inforL� 
Second, ambiguous information is likely to receive a partisln 
benefit of doubt in its interpretation. 
ated 
ion. 
Finally, we come back to vote choice. (7) sugges\:s lthe 
following model: 
Vote = PID l + B RE + C CIE 
+ (u - u 1) . , p p- p p p p p p-
I Like DRE, CIE are taken as exogenous. Naturally, if politics 
continuity, CIE will be associated with PID. But in the mo�e 
I ,is no causal link running from the latter to the former. If 1 
should consistently fail to display any importance in versiln; 
it might indicate the Downsian theory at work: CIE merely ie: 
past performance. Things appear more complex though. 
V. THE RESPONSE OF PID TO ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND PERFORMAfl'C
' 
has 
the 
IE 
of 
Table 2 contains estimates for the PID equation. I As a 
glance back at (9) shows there is one econometric complexity:' I PID 
will surely be correlated with the error term (u - u 1). Witlhout 
remedial action we risk biased and inconsistent :esu�:s. T�e
, 
(11) 
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standard remedy when using ordinary regression analysis is a two-
stage procedure which first estimates a "purged" variable, PID 1* p-
which then substitutes for the offending variable, PID 1 p- In the
case of probit analysis the two-stage estimates do not have all the 
desirable properties of the two-stage least squares estimates, but 
they do have the important property of consistency (Nelson and Olson, 
1977). In order to perform the two-stage analysis I first estimated 
PID1974* as a function of numerous demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics known to be related to PID as well as various 1974 
. 1 . 9 retrospective eva uations. This estimate substituted for the six 
dummy variables (formed from the seven point PID measure) which would 
normally be used. Table 2 contains both the first and second stage 
analyses for comparative purposes. 
[Table 2 here] 
The results are ambiguous. Previous PID is the strongest 
influence on present PID, which is not surprising. Among the vari-
ables of interest, presidential performance and favorable perceptions 
of government inflation and unemployment performance make a signif i-
cant contribution to current PID. The ambiguity arises from the 
fact that all of these are what I have termed mediated retrospective 
evaluations. The direct retrospective evaluations (financial 
situation, recession impact, and business conditions) fail to attain 
significance, except in the case of a wrong sign for "business 
conditions about the same. 1110 Thus, we must suspend judgment 
momentarily. PID appears to vary with the more complicated type of 
retrospective evaluation. Whether this speaks well or badly for a 
' 
' 
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TABLE 2 
1976 PID by 1974 PID and RE i 
One Stage 
I : 
Two Sta e I 
I 
Presidential Performance .46** .52** 
Nixon Pardon .38** 
I i 
.29*'(' 
Financial Situation - Same .l3t .or , 
- Better .llt .02 ' 
Government Inf la ti on Performance 
- Fair .08 .or
- Good .23* 
T Government Unemployment Performance 
- Fair - .05 .OB 
- Good .06 .26t1 
� 
1974 Strong Democrat -4.53** 
Weak Democrat -3.56** 
Independent Democrat -2.86** 
Independent -2.40** 
> .74*1 
' 
Independent Republican -l.65** 
Weak Republican - .97** -
Recession .02 .01 
Business Conditions - Better - .1ot .0.9 
- Same - .25* - .26* 
Civil Rights - Too Fast - .04 .o� 
- Too Slow - .1st - .lr 
Constant 4.01* _ .lr , 
B.2 • 73 I.39 ' I . 
rho .83 • 51
' 
n 1,208 9612 ! I , 
t p < .10 . 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
I 
2S 
political theory of PID depends on whether the mediated retrospective 
evaluations themselves reflect objective events and conditions, or 
whether they merely reflect previous party attachments. So, we turn 
now to that question. 
VI. THE INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND GENERAL PERFORMANCE FUNCTIONS 
Table 3 contains the estimates for the Inflation and 
Unemployment Performance Functions. These estimates give us ample 
reason for concluding that party identification changes in response 
to directly experienced economic conditions, for we see that such 
direct retrospective evaluations are important influences on judgments 
of government economic performance. The financial situation and 
business conditions variables are large and significant in both 
equations. Recession impact contributes to the judgment that 
government unemployment performance is poor, though the effect is not 
significant. Those nearing or experiencing fixed income status tend 
to be more critical of the government's inflation performance, while 
minority group members tend to be more critical of unemployment 
performance, though these relationships too are not significant. In 
short, table 3 shows that mediated retrospective evaluations reflect 
economics as well as psychology, and in combination with table 2 
supports the conclusion that party identification does also. 11
[Table 3 here] 
And what of the presidential performance function?12 Here
too, matters look satisfactory. The financial situation variable is 
TABLE 3 
GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE FUNCTIONS 
Financial Situation - Same 
- Better 
1974 Strong Democrat 
Weak Democrat 
Independent Democrat 
Independent 
Independent Republican 
Weak Republican 
Recession 
Business Conditions - Better 
Middle Glass 
Working Glass 
Age 60 & over 
Minority 
Constant 
R2 
rho 
n 
t p < . 10 
* p < . OS 
** p < . 01 
- Same 
Inflation 
- . 41** 
- . 36** 
. 76** 
.SS** 
. 64** 
. S2** 
. lS 
. 3S** 
- . 70** 
- . 26** 
- . OS 
. 06 
1.SO** 
. 19 
. 27 
l,S08 
' 
U�empl I 
-
I - - ' 
-· 
- .I 
-
1. 
, 41 I 
ent 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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not significant, but the business conditions variable is, as is the 
recession impact variable. The inflation and unemployment performance 
variables are especially important (more so than previous party 
identification, in fact) a situation we can regard with equanimity 
having viewed table 3. In fact, if we turn back to table 1, it
appears that the original "simple-minded" analysis was not so 
inaccurate after all. Even after developing a model which incorporates 
the principal source of suspected spuriousness, the impact of economic 
conditions and perceptions of government economic performance remains. 
[Table 4 here] 
By now we begin to see a pyramidding of effects. Directly 
experienced and/or narrowly perceived economic conditions affect more 
general economic performance judgments, both types of judgment feed 
into evaluations of presidential performance, and the more general 
judgments, at least, contribute to the modification of party identi-
fication. One question remains: does this pyramidding of effects 
continue through to the vote function? 
VII. THE 1976 VOTE FUNCTIONS 
The vote functions estimated for the presidential and 
congressional votes include PID 1, retrospective evaluations from p-
t he pth period , and current issue evaluations (i.e. future 
expectations). We have examined the first two components of these 
functions , what about the third? The CPS surveys include several 
items which appear to tap respondents' expectations about the future. 
For example, 
TABLE 4 
THE 1976 PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE FUNCTION 
Nixon Pardon 
Financial Si tua ti on - Same 
- Better 
Government Inflation Performance 
- Fair 
- Good 
Government Unemployment Performance 
- Fair 
- Good 
1974 Strong Democrat 
Weak Democrat 
Independent Democrat 
Independent 
Independent Republican 
Weak Republican 
Recession 
Business Conditions - Better 
- Same 
Civil Rights - Too Fast 
- Too Slow 
Constant 
1(2 
Correctly Predicted - Probit 
- Null 
n 
t p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
.90** 
- .01 
.10 
.64** 
1.32** 
;51** 
.83** 
-1.04** 
- .56** 
- .67** 
- .42* 
- .21 
- .30 
- .18* 
.30** 
.09 
.oo 
- .68** 
- .38t 
.57 
79.3 % 
63.8 
1,210 
28 
i 
r 
Future Inflation Expectation. "Do you think that infla-
tion would be handled better by the Democrats , by the 
Republicans , or about the same by both?" 
Future Unemployment Expectation. "Do you think the 
problems of unemployment would be handled better by the 
Democrats , by the Republicans , or about the same by both?" 
Future Problem Capability. "What do you think are the 
most important problems facing this country? (Of all 
you've told me) , what do you think is the single most 
important problem the country faces? Which political 
party do you think would be most likely to get the 
government to do a better job in dealing with this 
problem--the Republicans , the Democrats, or wouldn't 
there be much difference between them?" 
29 
We can use the preceding items to form indicators of issue 
expectations , add these to the variables listed in table 4 ,  and use 
the set to estimate the vote functions. Unfortunately , there are so 
many economic conditions/evaluations variables in the equations by 
this point that few of them have statistically significant impacts 
(although the goodness of fit they produce is excellent). Thus , I 
report in table 5 a pair of abbreviated equations. First , direct 
retrospective evaluations (financial situation , business conditions, 
recession) are eliminated from the presidential equation. We have 
seen that these contribute to the economic performance evaluations, 
and (from analyses unreported here) they also contribute to the future 
economic expectation functions. It appears to me that much of their 
30 
effect is indirect; certainly eliminating them causes no g1'ea
.
: � losi][ 
in predictive power in the presidential vote function. In adhitio ' 
only the issue concerns formed from the "most important.problems" 
 item are included. Problems cited in 1976 were heavily economic 
. I : anyway , and when inflation, unemployment and most important 
problems expectations are all included , the coefficients blc9me a 
I mess. I chose to use the "most important problems" item becatuse 
it is the most general and thus seems to permit a better sbe�ific��ruon 
than limiting issue concerns to economic ones. 
[Table 5 here] 
Table 5 presents the 1976 vote functions. Somewnab to m: 
surprise the most important influence on the vote appears lo ! lbe 
I , future expectations about the party best capable of meeting rlhe 
I , problems the country faces. Of course , an important determi: 
this expectation is past trends and conditions, as mentionld! 
I previously. But at any rate , each of the components of the 1 
model contributes significantly to the final decision. Palt 
identification from the previous period is highly signific�n¢ , so 
are retrospective evaluations from the current period. Tab]e 5 
yield• a port<ai< of <he voter "' one who mak" a ded•i1 �ised �I 
his hopes for the future , his curren
.
t state of satisfactior ;· and · 
more distant political experiences. And to reiterate , th, :©re 
distant experiences color the evaluations of recent eventi and 
conditions , and both color expectations for the future. On.the 
whole I find this portrait quite plausible. 
TABLE S 
1976 VOTE FUNCTIONS 
Ford Performance 
Nixon Pardon 
Financial Situation - Same 
- Better 
Government Inflation Performance 
- Fair 
- Good 
Government Unemployment Performance 
- Fair 
- Good 
Most Important Problem 
Republicans Better 
No Party Difference 
Don't Know who is better 
Civil Rights - Too Fast 
- Too Slow 
Party ID1974 
Constant 
ii2 
Correctly Predicted - Probit 
- Null 
n 
t p < . 10 
* p < . OS 
** p < . 01 
President 
1. 24** 
. S2** 
- . 01 
. 40t 
. 39** 
• 3St 
2. 33** 
l. lS** 
LOS** 
. 22t 
- . 78* 
. 43** 
2. 91** 
. 7S 
86. S % 
S0. 1 
690 
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House 
. 60** 
. 31** 
- . 03 
. 2lt 
- . 23 
. 23 
- . 02 
. 12 
. 81** 
. 47** 
. 3S 
. 07 
- . 16 
. 34** 
1. 43** 
. 40 
73. 4 % 
S6. 6 
S87 
•' 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Given the specific character of the foregoing work 
is not the place for general conclusions. Still , there is at
32 
s 
I least some basis for reaffirming the title of the paper: econqmic 
c=di<inn' and evalua<inn' appear <n have bn<h ahnr< and lnng�\•� 
effects on the vote. Previous micro-level research--my own included� 
haa found weak and incnn'i'<enc effec<' nf direc<ly experienc�d 
economic conditions. In this paper , however , we have seen ev�dence 
<ha< dir•c<ly experienced ecnnnmic effec<' have indirec< effllt, nn 
the vote , effects channeled through evaluations of executive petform���e , 
and through modifications in party identification . 
The voting model examined in the preceding pages isl m�re 
complicated than those underlying aggregate studies of the PB1C� I but 
considerably more realistic as well. Do voters respond simp�is icalill 
<n an expminn-cnn<rac<i= dynamic '"' in mn<i= by a cynkl I nver�I 
ment? We may find some marginal impact of election year varilt ons � 
�crnecnn�ic cnndi<inn, , bu< deeper , lnnger-la,<ing effec<' t� iaibl 
to us may occur as well. A party could find itself trading oiff its 
long-term positive image and its committed adherents for an elh mera] 
and uncertain vote gain. Parties may choose to make that tra��+of f 
on occasion--Richard Nixon's 1972 presidential campaign is pelli�ps a 
case in point. But at least there is some reason to believe bliat the 
PBC chickens eventually come home to roost , as perhaps they d�d lfor 
Nixon's Republican party in 1974. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The findings from this larger project will be reported in a book 
2. 
now in progress tentatively titled Retrospective Voting in 
American National Elections. I wish to acknowledge the important 
financial support of the National Science Foundation (NSF Soc 
76-02083) in making this work possible. 
Kramer also included crude measures of incumbency and presidential 
coattails. Most of the aggregate analyses make some effort in 
this direction. 
3. The two items included give us some rough indicators of Watergate 
and the racial issue, both of which played a role in the 1976 
election. The one type of variable missing from the specification 
is some indicator of foreign affairs, which while not terribly 
salient in 1976 plays some role in every presidential election. 
4. The categorical nature of the dependent variables in this study 
(approve/disapprove, vote Republican/vote Democrat, strong 
Democrat/weak Democrat/independent Democrat/Independent/ 
independent Republican/weak Republican/strong Republican) violates 
the assumptions of standard regression analysis. Specifically, 
heteroskedasticity results in biased estimates of the standard 
11>4 
errors of the estimated coefficients. Various alternativ
t
'e� 
available. The one chosen in this work is an n-chotomous p 
procedure developed by Zavoina and McKelvey (1975}. It Js i 
generalization of ordinary probit based on the assumptioJ ti 
the dependent variable has at least ordinal characterist�cJ 
The procedure produces maximum likelihood parameter estiJatles 
., weLl � eati�te• of thre•hold• on the (�obae�ed) nor� 
dependent variable. These thresholds are assumed to determ 
the correspondence between the observed discrete categorJes 
are 
obit 
at
nuou 
.ne 
and 
a range of values on the underlying unobserved variable. I HiTPo-
thesis testing is straightforward, but the 
measures are less so. In the tables which 
an analogue to the familiar R2 of standard 
goodness of f 
I
t 
follow we report 
regression anJlf 
The former is intended as an estimate of the latter, and lis 
"2 R ' 
is. 
obtained by substituting the observed categorical values lfot the 
unobserved values. The sampling distribution of R2 is unkn wn . 
I ' Typically it attains a higher value than the R2 produced ry an 
ual 
OLS regression analysis of the same data. A second statistl1c 
is the Spearman rank order correlation (rho) between the le 
and predicted values. The statistic is not very useful � 
are many tie values among the observations being correlated 
This condition is inevitable if one's dependent variable ha 
a small number of categories (e.g. 0,1), hence I do not Jep 
here 
onl 
rt 
it for the dichotomous case. Finally, there is a percent! d©rrecti 
predicted statistic. If an observation is 
between two thresholds which correspond to 
predicted to l�e 
 an observed ca�egory 
5. 
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and it does, a correct prediction is recorded. In contrast to 
rho, this statistic is not so useful when the number of categories 
in the dependent variable is large: mispredicting a strong 
Democrat to be a strong Repulican is considered no worse than 
mispredicting him/her to be a weak Democrat. Hence I report this 
statistic only for the dichotomous case where no ambiguity arises. 
In the latter case I also report a null figure obtained as follows. 
If 85 percent of the sample approves the president's performance, 
a probit analysis which predicts 85 percent correctly does no 
better than the null model that everyone approves the president's 
performance. In contrast, if only 50 percent of the sample 
approve the president's performance, an 85 percent correct 
prediction from the probit analysis is more impressive. The null 
prediction is always the proportion of observations which exhibit 
the more frequently observed behavior in the sample. 
Note that no comparability assumptions are made here. For example, 
citizens might evaluate the candidates on different dimensions 
(both as to content and number), using different distance functions, 
different utility functions, etc. 
6. Obviously condition (3) includes condition (2) as a special case.
7. It is worth noting that the proposed definition does not imply 
that the strength of party ID is interpersonally comparable. 
Behaviorally, people in the various categories of party ID appear 
36 
I 
I 
to behave roughly the same the country over. But therl: �s no
in oucrnn' �aanrnmn°' m°'hnda (nr "" prn•=' �dnl) H 
interpersonal meaningfulness of the party ID categorielJ ,, 
ch i 
8. Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) have argued that "personal e<hoh!omic 
grievances" such as a worsened financial situation are l l�lss 
9. 
important influences on voting than are "collective ec6nbmic 
judgments" such as government economic performance. ulfl�tuna 
this distinction almost perfectly coincides with that Je�ween 
and MRE. It is not yet clear whether the stronger staji�tica� 
·performance of the collective judgments reflects the cJ1i cti l 
focus or simply the fact that these items incorporate ldl�tio 
influences such as previous PID (table 3). 
1974 PID* was constructed by estimating actual PID as d i 
of dummy variables representing age, occupation, incomJ, i 
ethnic, education and regional categories, plus others lrJ 
1972 retrospective evaluations such as financial situatiJ 
ncti 
:::1 
unemployment, civil rights, etc. �2 ·.J. The R between actuall �ad 
substitute PID is . 28, rho = . 49. 
10. It is quite possible that anomalies like these stem frot �he 
intercorrelations among the right hand side variables. 
11. The fits of these equations are the poorest of all that 
estimated. The distributions of responses to the econo1hi
1 
ave 
ng 
res 
y, 
ng 
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performance items are highly skewed, roughly 10: 50:40 over the 
good-fair-poor categories. Other dependent variables in the 
analysis show much more even distributions. 
12. Use of the term "performance" rather than "popularity" is 
deliberate. The survey item, after all, explicitly requests 
a performance assessment. Substitution of "popularity" 
implicitly suggests that the assessments are frivolous 
expressions of personal liking rather than substantive 
political judgments. 
.!."' 
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